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INTRODUCTION: Several novel variants of se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19,
emerged in late 2020. One of these, Variant
of Concern (VOC) 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7),
was first detected in southeast England in
September 2020 and spread to become the
dominant lineage in the United Kingdom in
just a few months. B.1.1.7 has since spread to
at least 114 countries worldwide.
RATIONALE: The rapid spread of VOC202012/01
suggests that it transmits more efficiently from
person to person than preexisting variants of
SARS-CoV-2. This could lead to global surges in
COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths, so there
is an urgent need to estimate how much more
quickly VOC 202012/01 spreads, whether it is
associatedwith greater or lesser severity of dis-
ease, and what control measures might be ef-
fective in mitigating its impact. We used social
contact andmobilitydata, aswell asdemographic
indicators linked to SARS-CoV-2 community test-
ing data inEngland, to assesswhether the spread
of the new variant may be an artifact of higher
baseline transmission rates in certain geograph-
ical areas or among specific demographic subpop-
ulations.We then used a series of complementary
statistical analyses and mathematical models to
estimate the transmissibility of VOC 202012/01
across multiple datasets from the UK, Denmark,
Switzerland, and the United States. Finally, we
extended amathematical model that has been
extensively used to forecast COVID-19 dynam-
ics in theUK to consider two competing SARS-
CoV-2 lineages: VOC 202012/01 and preexisting
variants. By fitting this model to a variety of
data sources on infections, hospitalizations,
and deaths across seven regions of England,
we assessed different hypotheses for why the
new variant appears to be spreading more
quickly, estimated the severity of disease as-
sociated with the new variant, and evaluated
control measures including vaccination and
nonpharmaceutical interventions. Combining
multiple lines of evidence allowed us to draw
robust inferences.
RESULTS: The rapid spread of VOC 202012/01
is not an artifact of geographical differences in
contact behavior and does not substantially
differ by age, sex, or socioeconomic stratum.
We estimate that the new variant has a 43 to
90% higher reproduction number (range of
95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) than pre-
existing variants. Similar increases are observed
inDenmark, Switzerland, and theUnited States.
The most parsimonious explanation for this
increase in the reproduction number is that
people infected with VOC 202012/01 are more
infectious than people infected with a preex-
isting variant, although there is also reason-
able support for a longer infectious period and
multiple mechanisms may be operating. Our
estimates of severity are uncertain and are con-
sistent with anything from amoderate decrease
to a moderate increase in severity (e.g., 32%
lower to 20% higher odds of death given infec-
tion). Nonetheless, our mathematical model,
fitted todataup to 24December 2020, predicted
a large surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths in
2021, which has been borne out so far by the
observed burden in England up to the end of
March 2021. In the absence of stringent non-
pharmaceutical interventions and an accelerated
vaccine rollout, COVID-19 deaths in the first
6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed
those in 2020 in England.
CONCLUSION: More than 98% of positive SARS-
CoV-2 infections inEnglandarenowdue toVOC
202012/01, and the spread of this new variant
has led to a surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths.
Other countries should prepare for potentially
similar outcomes.▪
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Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern 202012/01. (A) Spread of VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7)
in England. (B) The estimated relative transmissibility of VOC 202012/01 (mean and 95% confidence
interval) is similar across the United Kingdom as a whole, England, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United
States. (C) Projected COVID-19 deaths (median and 95% confidence interval) in England, 15 December 2020
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A severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7),
emerged in southeast England in September 2020 and is rapidly spreading toward fixation. Using a variety of
statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, we estimate that this variant has a 43 to 90% (range of 95%
credible intervals, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain
dynamic transmission model shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases.
Without stringent control measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly
accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths across England in the first 6 months of
2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020. VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar
transmission increase (59 to 74%) in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States.
I
nDecember 2020, evidence began to emerge
that a severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, Var-
iant of Concern 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7,
henceforth VOC 202012/01), was rapidly
outcompeting preexisting variants in southeast
England (1). The variant increased in inci-
dence during the second national lockdown
in November 2020, which was mandated in
response to a previous and unrelated surge
in COVID-19 cases, and continued to spread
after the lockdown despite ongoing restrictions
in many of the most affected areas. Concern
over this variant led the UK government to
enact stronger restrictions in these regions
on 20 December 2020 and eventually to impose
a third national lockdown on 5 January 2021. As
of 29 March 2021, VOC 202012/01 comprises
roughly 95% of new SARS-CoV-2 infections in
England and has now been identified in at least
114 countries (2). Our current understanding of
effective pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceut-
ical control of SARS-CoV-2 does not reflect the
epidemiological and clinical characteristics of
VOC 202012/01. Estimates of the growth rate,
disease severity, and impact of this novel var-
iant are crucial for informing rapid policy re-
sponses to this potential threat.
Characteristics of the new variant
VOC 202012/01 is defined by 17 mutations (14
nonsynonymous point mutations and three
deletions), of which eight are in the spike
protein, which mediates SARS-CoV-2 attach-
ment and entry into human cells. At least three
mutations potentially affect viral function. Mu-
tation N501Y is a key contact residue in the
receptor binding domain and enhances virus
binding affinity to human angiotensin-converting
enzyme 2 (ACE2) (3, 4). Mutation P681H is
immediately adjacent to the furin cleavage
site in spike, a known region of importance
for infection and transmission (5, 6). Deletion
DH69/DV70 in spike has arisen in multiple
independent lineages of SARS-CoV-2, is linked
to immune escape in immunocompromised
patients, and enhances viral infectivity in vitro
(7, 8). This deletion is also responsible for cer-
tain commercial testing kits failing to detect
the spike glycoprotein gene, and genomic data
confirm that these S gene target failures in
England are now overwhelmingly attributable
to the new variant (1).
The proportion of COVID-19 cases attributa-
ble to VOC 202012/01 increased rapidly in all
regions of England, following an initial expan-
sion in the southeast (Fig. 1A), and spread at
comparable rates among males and females
and across age and socioeconomic strata (Fig.
1B). One potential explanation for the spread of
VOC 202012/01 within England is a founder
effect; that is, if certain regions had higher
levels of transmission as a result of more
social interactions, variants that were more
prevalent within these regions could become
more common overall. Changes in social con-
tact patterns correlate closely with changes in
transmission (9) (Fig. 1, C and D) and with
COVID-19 burden in England (10). However,
we did not find substantial differences in so-
cial interactions between regions of high and
low VOC 202012/01 prevalence, as measured
by Google mobility (11) and social contact sur-
vey data (12) fromSeptember toDecember 2020
(Fig. 1, E and F). Therefore, the apparent de-
coupling between contact rates and transmission
in late 2020may suggest altered transmission
characteristics for VOC 202012/01.
Measuring the new variant’s growth rate
VOC 202012/01 appears unmatched in its ability
to outcompete other SARS-CoV-2 lineages in
England. Analyzing the COG-UK dataset (13),
which comprisesmore than 150,000 sequenced
SARS-CoV-2 samples from across the UK, we
found that the relative population growth rate
of VOC 202012/01 in the first 31 days after its
initial phylogenetic observationwas higher than
that of all 307 other lineages with enough ob-
servations to obtain reliable growth-rate esti-
mates (Fig. 2A and fig. S1). Although the relative
growth rate of VOC 202012/01 has declined
slightly over time, it remains among the highest
of any lineage as a function of lineage age (Fig.
2B), and the lineage continues to expand.
To quantify the growth advantage of VOC
202012/01, we performed a series of multino-
mial and logistic regression analyses on COG-
UK data. A time-varying multinomial spline
model estimates an increased growth rate for
VOC 202012/01 of +0.104 day–1 [95% confidence
interval (CI), 0.100 to 0.108] relative to the pre-
viously dominant lineage, B.1.177 (Table 1,mod-
el 1a; Fig. 2C; and figs. S2 and S3). Assuming a
generation interval of 5.5 days (14), this cor-
responds to a 77% (95% CI, 73 to 81%) increase
in the reproduction number R. The growth ad-
vantage of VOC 202012/01 persists undermore
conservative model assumptions (Table 1,
model 1b; fig. S4), is consistent across all re-
gions of the UK (table S1, model 2a; fig. S5),
and is similar when measured from S gene
target failures among community COVID-19
tests instead of COG-UK sequence data (Table 1,
model 2h; fig. S6). Data from other countries
yield similar results: We estimate that R for VOC
202012/01 relative to other lineages is 55% (95%
CI, 45 to 66%) higher in Denmark, 74% (95% CI,
66 to 82%) higher in Switzerland, and 59% (95%
CI, 56 to 63%) higher in the United States, with
consistent rates of displacement across regions
within each country (Table 1, models 3a to 3c;
figs. S6 and S7).
As an alternative approach, we performed a
regression analysis of reproduction numbers
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estimated from case data against the fre-
quency of S gene target failure in English
upper-tier local authorities (Fig. 2D), using
local control policies and mobility data as
covariates and including a time-varying
spline to capture any unmeasured confounders.
This yielded an estimated increase in R for VOC
202012/01 of 43% (95% CI, 38 to 48%), increas-
ing to a 57% (95% CI, 52 to 62%) increase if
the spline was not included (Table 1, models
4a and 4b). The various statistical models we
fitted yield slightly different estimates for the
growth rate of VOC 202012/01, reflecting dif-
ferent assumptions and model structures, but
all identify a substantially increased growth
rate (table S1).
Mechanistic hypotheses for the rapid spread
To understand possible biological mechanisms
for the faster spread of VOC 202012/01 relative
to preexisting variants, we extended an age-
structured and regionally structured math-
ematical model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission
(10, 15) to consider two co-circulating variants
(fig. S8 and tables S2 and S3). The model uses
Google mobility data (11), validated by social
contact surveys (10), to capture changes in
contact patterns over time for each region of
England.We created five versions of themodel,
each including one alternative parameter cap-
turing a potential mechanism.
The hypotheses we tested are as follows.
First, observations of lower cycle threshold
(Ct) values (16–18)—that is, higher viral load—
support the idea that VOCmay be more trans-
missible per contact with an infectious person
than preexisting variants (hypothesis 1). Sec-
ond, longitudinal testing data (17) suggest that
VOCmay be associated with a longer period of
viral shedding and hence a potentially longer
infectious period (hypothesis 2). Third, the
DH69/DV70 deletion in spike contributed to
immune escape in an immunocompromised
patient (7), which suggests that immunity to
preexisting variants may afford reduced pro-
tection against infectionwith VOC (hypothesis
3). Fourth, the initial spread of VOCduring the
November 2020 lockdown in England, during
which schools were open, suggests that chil-
drenmay bemore susceptible to infectionwith
VOC than with preexisting variants (hypothe-
sis 4). Children are typically less susceptible to
SARS-CoV-2 infection than adults (19, 20), pos-
sibly because of immune cross-protection due
to other human coronaviruses (21), which could
be less protective against VOC. Finally, VOC
could have a shorter generation time than
preexisting variants (hypothesis 5). A shorter
generation time could account for an increased
growth rate without requiring a higher repro-
duction number, which would make control of
VOC 202012/01 through social distancingmea-
sures relatively easier to achieve.
We fit each model to time series of COVID-19
deaths, hospital admissions, hospital and ICU
bed occupancy, polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
prevalence, seroprevalence, and theproportion of
community SARS-CoV-2 tests with S gene target
failure across the three most heavily affected
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Fig. 1. Rapid spread of VOC 202012/01 in England. (A) Proportion of S
gene target failure among positive Pillar 2 community SARS-CoV-2 tests in
upper-tier local authorities of England from 1 October 2020 to 10 January 2021,
sorted by latitude. (B) Spread of S gene target failure by age, index of
multiple deprivation decile (1 = most deprived), and sex within Greater
London. (C and D) Estimates of R0 from CoMix social contact survey (12)
compared to Rt estimates from REACT-1 prevalence survey (9) for England,
with 90% CIs. Rt estimates based on single and aggregated REACT-1 survey
rounds are shown. Horizontal error bars in (C) show the date range over which Rt was
measured. (E and F) Percentage change (95% CI) in Google Mobility indices relative
to baseline over time (E) and setting-specific mean contacts (95% CI) from the
CoMix study (12) over time and by age for Tier 4 local authorities compared to the
rest of England (F). Tier 4 local authorities are areas within the South East, East
of England, and London regions that were placed under stringent restrictions from
20 December 2020 because of high prevalence of VOC 202012/01 and growing case
rates. Gray shaded areas show the second national lockdown in England.










NHS England regions, over the period 1 March
to 24 December 2020 (Fig. 3 and figs. S9 to S14).
We assessedmodels using deviance information
criteria (DIC) and compared model predictions
to observed data for the 14 days after the fitting
period (i.e., 25 December 2020–7 January 2021).
Of the five hypotheses assessed, hypothesis 1
(increased transmissibility) had the lowest (i.e.,
best) combined DIC and predictive deviance.
Hypothesis 2 (longer infectious period) and
hypothesis 4 (increased susceptibility in chil-
dren) also fitted the data well, although hy-
pothesis 4 is not well supported by household
secondary attack rate data (fig. S15) or by age-
specific patterns of S gene target failure in the
community (fig. S16), neither of which identify
a substantial increase in susceptibility among
children. Hypothesis 3 (immune escape) and
hypothesis 5 (shorter generation time) fit poorly
(Fig. 3A and table S4). In particular, hypothesis
5 predicted that the relative frequency of VOC
202012/01 should have dropped during strin-
gent restrictions in lateDecember 2020, because
when two variants have the same effective
reproduction number Rt < 1 but different
generation times, infections decline faster for
the variant with the shorter generation time.
We fitted a combined model incorporating
the five hypotheses above, but it was not able
to identify a single consistentmechanismacross
NHS England regions; hence, a wide range of
parameter values are compatible with the ob-
served growth rate of VOC 202012/01 (fig. S14).
On the basis of our analysis, we identify in-
creased transmissibility as the most parsimo-
nious model, but we emphasize that the five
mechanisms explored here are not mutually
exclusive and may be operating in concert.
The increased transmissibility model does
not identify a clear increase or decrease in the
severity of disease associated with VOC 202012/
01, finding similar odds of hospitalization given
infection [odds ratio, 0.92; 95% credible interval
(CrI), 0.77 to 1.10], critical illness [odds ratio,
0.90 (CrI, 0.58 to 1.40)], and death [odds ratio,
0.90 (0.68 to 1.20)]when themodelwas fitted to
the three most heavily affected NHS England
regions (Fig. 3B). These estimates should be
treated with caution, as we would not expect
to identify a clear signal of severitywhen fitting
to data up to 24 December 2020, given delays
between infection and hospitalization or death.
However, the fittedmodel finds strong evidence
of higher relative transmissibility, estimated at
65% (CrI, 39 to 93%) higher than preexisting
variants for the threemost heavily affectedNHS
England regions, or 82% (CrI, 43 to 130%)when
estimated across all sevenNHSEngland regions
(Table 1,model 5a). These estimates of increased
transmissibility are consistent with our statisti-
cal estimates and with a previous estimate of a
70% increased reproduction number for VOC
202012/01 (16). Thismodel reproduces observed
epidemiological dynamics for VOC 202012/01
(Fig. 3C and fig. S17). Without the introduction
of a new variant with a higher growth rate, the
model is unable to reproduce observed dynam-
ics (Fig. 3, D and E, and figs. S17 to S19); these
findings lend further support to the idea that
changing contact patterns do not explain the
spread of VOC 202012/01.
Implications for COVID-19 dynamics
in England
Using the best-performing transmission model
(increased transmissibility) fitted to all seven
NHS England regions, we compared projected
epidemic dynamics under different assumptions
about controlmeasures frommid-December 2020
to the end of June 2021. We compared four
scenarios for nonpharmaceutical interventions
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Fig. 2. Measuring the growth rate of VOC 202012/01. (A) Average relativized
growth rate (i.e., a measure of variant fitness relative to other variants present
during the 31 days after initial phylogenetic observation of a given variant) for all
lineages in the COG-UK dataset, highlighting many lineages that have risen to
prominence including B.1.177, the lineage with the highest relative abundance
during the initial phylogenetic observation of VOC 202012/01. The shaded
regions show conservative 95% rejection intervals; VOC 202012/01 is the first
strain to exceed this threshold of faster relativized growth. Although many
lineages exhibit above-average rates of growth, VOC 202012/01 has had the
highest average relativized growth of any lineage in the history of COG-UK
surveillance of SARS-COV-2. (B) Plotting all lineages’ relativized growth rates
[r(t)] as a function of lineage age with conservative 95% rejection intervals
highlights the significantly faster growth of VOC 202012/01 relative to other
lineages at comparable times since their initial observation. Later declines in VOC
and B.1.177 correspond to highly uncertain estimates of growth rates for data
that are yet to be backfilled, so these declines in r(t) are sensitive to the
processing of future sequences from recent dates (fig. S1). (C) Muller plots of the
relative abundances of the major SARS-CoV-2 variants in the UK, based on a
multinomial spline fit to COG-UK sequence data (Table 1 and table S1, separate-
slopes multinomial spline model). A model extrapolation until 1 March 2021 is
shown (shaded area). Minority variants are 440 circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants
of low abundance. Specific colors represent the same lineages in (A) to (C).
(D) Mean reproduction number over 7-day periods in 149 upper-tier local
authorities of England (colored by the NHS England region they are within)
plotted against the weekly proportion of Pillar 2 community SARS-CoV-2 tests
with S gene target failure shows the spread of VOC 202012/01, a corresponding
increase in the reproduction number in each local authority, and the eventual
impact of targeted government restrictions from 20 December 2020. Testing
data are shown for the week after the reproduction number estimates to account
for delays from infection to test.










(NPIs) introduced on 1 January 2021: (i) a
moderate-stringency scenario with mobility levels
as observed in the first half of October 2020;
(ii) a high-stringency scenario with mobility
levels as observed during the second national
lockdown in England in November 2020, with
schools open; (iii) the same high-stringency
scenario, butwith schools closed until 15 February
2021; and (iv) a very-high-stringency scenario
with mobility levels as observed during the
first national lockdown in early April 2020,
with schools closed (fig. S20). In combination
with these NPI scenarios, we considered three
vaccination scenarios: no vaccinations; 200,000
vaccinations per week; and 2 million vaccina-
tionsperweek.Weassumed that vaccine rollout
starts on 1 January 2021 and that vaccinated
individuals have a 95% lower probability of
disease and a 60% lower probability of infection
than unvaccinated individuals. For simplicity,
we assume that vaccine protection is conferred
immediately upon receipt of one vaccine dose.
Note that these projections serve as indicative
scenarios rather than formal predictive forecasts.
Regardless of control measures, all regions
of England were projected to experience a new
wave of COVID-19 cases and deaths in early
2021, peaking in February 2021 if no substantial
control measures were introduced, or in mid-
January 2021 if strong control measures suc-
ceeded in reducing R below 1 (Fig. 4A). In the
absence of substantial vaccine rollout, the num-
bers of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, ICU
admissions, and deaths in the first 6 months of
2021wereprojected toexceed those in2020, even
with stringent NPIs in place (Table 2). Imple-
menting more stringent measures in January
2021 (scenarios iii and iv) led to a larger rebound
in cases when simulated restrictions were lifted
in March 2021, particularly in those regions that
hadbeen least affectedup toDecember 2020 (fig.
S21). However, more stringent measures may
buy time to reachmorewidespread population
immunity through vaccination. Vaccine rollout
furthermitigated transmission, although the im-
pact of vaccinating 200,000 people per week—
similar in magnitude to the rates reached in
December 2020—was relatively small (Fig. 4B
and fig. S22). An accelerated uptake of 2 mil-
lion people fully vaccinated per week (i.e.,
4 million doses for a two-dose vaccine) had
a much more substantial impact (Fig. 4C and
fig. S23). However, accelerated vaccine rollout
had a relatively limited impact on peak burden,
as the peak was largely mediated by the
stringency of NPIs enacted in January 2021,
before vaccination had much of an impact.
The primary benefit of accelerated vaccine
rollout lies in helping to avert a resurgence of
cases after the relaxation of NPIs, and in
reducing transmission after the peak bur-
den has already been reached.
As a sensitivity analysis, we also ran model
projections with a seasonal component such
that transmission is 20%higher inwinter than
in summer (22), but this did not qualitatively
affect our results (fig. S24 and table S5).
Discussion
Combining multiple behavioral and epidemio-
logical data sourceswith statistical anddynamic
modeling, we estimated that the SARS-CoV-2
variant VOC 202012/01 has a 43 to 90% (range
of 95% CrIs, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction
number than preexisting variants of SARS-
CoV-2 in England, assuming no changes to
the generation interval. On the basis of early
population-level data, we were unable to iden-
tify whether the new variant is associated with
higher disease severity. Theoretical consid-
erations suggest that, in some cases, natural
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Table 1. Estimates of increased reproduction number for VOC 202012/01. Means and 95% CIs (GLMM) or 95% CrIs (Rt regression, transmission model)
are shown. GLMM models do not estimate a baseline growth rate or reproduction number. Increases in the reproduction number assume a generation interval
of 5.5 days. See table S1 for full details.
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*VOC 202012/01 versus B.1.177. †VOC 202012/01 versus all other variants. ‡Binomial counts adjusted for the true positive rate (proportion of S gene target failures that are VOC 202012/01),
estimated from misclassification model (for UK) or a binomial GLMM fitted to sequencing data of S gene target failures (for US).










selection may favor reduced severity of disease
in pathogens (23). For this to be true, however,
the pathogen’s infectious period must be trun-
cated by disabling symptoms or death often
enough that a less-virulent mutant generates
more secondary infections despite potentially
being less transmissible per contact, to the
extent that decreased virulence and decreased
transmissibility are consequences of the same
mutation (e.g., one that decreases viral load). It
is far from clear that this condition holds for
SARS-CoV-2, given substantial transmission
before the onset of severe symptoms. Regard-
less, without strengthened controls, there is
a clear risk that future epidemic waves may
be larger—and hence associated with greater
burden—than previous waves. The UK govern-
ment initiated a third national lockdown on
5 January 2021 in response to the rapid spread
of VOC 202012/01, including school closures.
Educational settings are among the largest
institutions linked to SARS-CoV-2 clusters that
remained open during the November 2020
lockdown (24), whichmeans that the enacted
school and university closures may have sub-
stantially assisted in reducing the burden
of COVID-19 in early 2021.
The increase in transmission associated with
VOC 202012/01 has crucial implications for vac-
cination. First, it means that prompt and effi-
cient vaccine delivery and distribution are even
more important to reduce the impact of the
pandemic in the near future. Increased trans-
mission resulting from VOC 202012/01 will
raise the herd immunity threshold, so that the
potential burden of SARS-CoV-2 is larger and
higher vaccine coverage will be required to
achieve herd immunity. It is therefore extremely
concerning that VOC 202012/01 has spread to at
least 114 countries globally (2). Although VOC
202012/01 was first identified in England, a
rapidly spreading variant has also been de-
tected in South Africa (25, 26), where there was
amarked increase in transmission in late 2020.
Another variant exhibiting immune escape has
emerged in Brazil (27, 28). Thus, vaccination
timelines will also be a crucial determinant of
future burden in other countries where similar
new variants are present. Second, there is a
need to assess how VOC 202012/01 and other
emerging lineages affect the efficacy of vac-
cines (29, 30). Vaccine developers may need
to consider developing formulationswith var-
iant sequences, and they may want to initiate
post-licensure studies to detect differences
in efficacy between the preexisting and new
variants. Licensing authorities may need to
clarify abbreviated pathways to marketing for
vaccines that involve altering strain formulation
without any other changes to their composition.
There are limitations to our analysis. We
have considered a small number of interven-
tion and vaccination scenarios, which should
not be regarded as the only available options
for policy-makers. Our transmission model does
not explicitly capture nursing home or hospital
transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and we fit the
model to each region of England separately
rather than pooling information across re-
gions and explicitly modeling transmission
between regions. There are also uncertain-
ties in the choice of model used to generate
these predictions, and the exact choice will
yield differences in the measures needed to
control the epidemic. We note that even
without increased susceptibility of children
to VOC 202012/01, the more efficient spread
of the variant implies that the difficult societal
decision of closing schools will be a key public
health question for multiple countries in the
months ahead.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of possible biological mechanisms underlying the rapid
spread of VOC 202012/01. Each row shows a different assumed mechanism.
(A) Relative frequency of VOC 202012/01 (black line and ribbon respectively
denote observed S gene target failure frequency with 95% binomial credible
interval; purple line and ribbon respectively denote mean and 95% credible
interval from model fit). (B) Posterior estimates (mean and 95% credible
intervals) for relative odds of hospitalization (severe illness), relative odds of
ICU admission (critical illness), relative odds of death (fatal illness), growth rate
as a multiplicative factor per week [i.e., exp(7·Dr)], and the parameter that
defines the hypothesized mechanism; all parameters are relative to those
estimated for preexisting variants. (C to E) Illustrative model fits for the South
East NHS England region: (C) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model
with VOC 202012/01 included; (D) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility
model with VOC 202012/01 removed; (E) fitted single-strain model without
emergence of VOC 202012/01. Black lines denote observed data; error bars
denote the date range and 95% credible intervals for observed PCR prevalence
and seroprevalence; colored lines and ribbons denote median and 95% credible
intervals from model fit.
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Fig. 4. Projections of epidemic dynamics under different control measures.
We compare four alternative scenarios for nonpharmaceutical interventions from
1 January 2021: (i) mobility returning to levels observed during relatively
moderate restrictions in early October 2020; (ii) mobility as observed during the
second lockdown in England in November 2020, then gradually returning to
October 2020 levels from 1 March to 1 April 2021, with schools open; (iii) as (ii),
but with schools closed until 15 February 2021; (iv) as (iii), but with a lockdown of
greater stringency as observed in March 2020 (fig. S20). (A) Without
vaccination. (B) With 200,000 people vaccinated per week. (C) With 2 million
people vaccinated per week. We assume that vaccination confers 95% vaccine
efficacy against disease and 60% vaccine efficacy against infection, and that
vaccination starts on 1 January 2021 with vaccine protection starting immediately
upon receipt. This is intended to approximate the fact that vaccination started in
early December, with full protection occurring after a time lag and potentially
after a second dose. Vaccines are given first to people aged 70+ until 85%
coverage is reached in this age group, then to people aged 60+ until 85%
coverage is reached in this age group, continuing into younger age groups in
10-year decrements. Resurgences starting in March 2021 are due to the
relaxation of nonpharmaceutical interventions, including reopening schools
(fig. S20). Median and 95% credible intervals are shown. The dashed lines in
rows 2 and 3 show peak hospitalizations and deaths from the first COVID-19
wave in England (April 2020).




High with schools closed Very high (March 2020)
No vaccination
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak ICU (relative to 1st wave) 274% (256–292%) 162% (151–172%) 130% (122–136%) 119% (112–124%)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak ICU bed requirement 9,980 (9,330–10,600) 5,880 (5,490–6,280) 4,720 (4,450–4,960) 4,310 (4,070–4,530)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak deaths 3,960 (3,730–4,200) 2,050 (1,920–2,160) 1,500 (1,440–1,570) 1,830 (1,670–2,000)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Total admissions 635,000 (604,000–659,000) 454,000 (432,000–472,000) 448,000 (425,000–466,000) 450,000 (425,000–472,000)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Total deaths 216,000 (205,000–227,000) 146,000 (138,000–152,000) 147,000 (139,000–155,000) 149,000 (140,000–157,000)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
200,000 vaccinations per week
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak ICU (relative to 1st wave) 269% (252–287%) 160% (149–170%) 130% (122–136%) 118% (112–124%)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak ICU bed requirement 9,790 (9,150–10,400) 5,810 (5,430–6,200) 4,710 (4,450–4,950) 4,310 (4,070–4,520)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak deaths 3,700 (3,500–3,920) 1,930 (1,820–2,040) 1,490 (1,430–1,550) 1,320 (1,280–1,380)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Total admissions 610,000 (580,000–634,000) 438,000 (416,000–454,000) 415,000 (394,000–430,000) 394,000 (373,000–413,000)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Total deaths 202,000 (192,000–213,000) 137,000 (130,000–143,000) 129,000 (123,000–135,000) 119,000 (112,000–125,000)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
2 million vaccinations per week
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak ICU (relative to 1st wave) 236% (221–252%) 149% (139–158%) 128% (121–134%) 118% (111–124%)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak ICU bed requirement 8,590 (8,050–9,170) 5,400 (5,070–5,760) 4,650 (4,390–4,880) 4,290 (4,060–4,500)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Peak deaths 2,470 (2,330–2,610) 1,510 (1,450–1,580) 1,390 (1,340–1,450) 1,290 (1,250–1,340)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Total admissions 483,000 (459,000–502,000) 353,000 (337,000–366,000) 277,000 (265,000–287,000) 190,000 (182,000–197,000)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Total deaths 140,000 (133,000–146,000) 98,900 (94,600–103,000) 81,000 (77,600–84,200) 58,200 (56,100–60,300)
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .










We only assess relative support in the data
for the mechanistic hypotheses proposed, but
there may be other plausible mechanisms
driving the resurgence of cases that we did
not consider, and we have not identified the
specific combination of mechanisms driving
the increased transmission of VOC 202012/01.
We identify increased transmissibility as the
most parsimonious mechanistic explanation
for the higher growth rate of VOC 202012/01,
but a longer infectious period also fits the data
well (table S4) and is supported by longitudinal
testing data (17). Our conclusions about school
closures were based on the assumption that
children had reduced susceptibility and infec-
tiousness relative to adults (19), but the precise
values of these parameters and the impact of
school closures remain the subject of scientific
debate (31). We based our assumptions about
the efficacy of NPIs on themeasured impact on
mobility of previous national lockdowns in
England, but the impact of policy options
cannot be predicted with certainty.
Despite these limitations, we found strong
evidence that VOC 202012/01 is spreading
substantially faster than preexisting SARS-
CoV-2 variants. Our modeling analysis sug-
gests that this difference could be explained
by an overall higher infectiousness of VOC
202012/01, but not by a shorter generation
time or immune escape alone. Further exper-
imental work will provide insight into the
biological mechanisms for our observations,
but given our projections of a rapid rise in
incidence from VOC 202012/01—and the de-
tection of other novel and highly transmissi-
ble variants (25–28)—there is an urgent need
to consider what new approaches may be re-
quired to sufficiently reduce the ongoing trans-
mission of SARS-CoV-2.
Materials and methods
Summary of control measures in England
in late 2020
After a resurgence of cases in September and
October 2020, a second national lockdown
was implemented inEngland, from5November
to 2 December 2020. Restrictions included a
stay-at-home order with exemptions for exer-
cise, essential shopping, obtaining or providing
medical care, education, and work for those
unable towork fromhome. Schools were kept
open.Non-essential shops and retail and leisure
venues were required to close. Pubs, bars, and
restaurants were allowed to offer takeaway
services only. After the second national lock-
down, regions in England were assigned to
tiered local restrictions according tomedium,
high, and very high alert levels (Tiers 1, 2, and 3).
In response to rising cases in southeast England
and concerns over VOC 202012/01, the UK
government announced on 19 December 2020
that a number of regions in southeast England
would be placed into a new, more stringent
“Tier 4,” corresponding to a Stay at Home alert
level. Tier 4 restrictions were broadly similar to
the second national lockdown restrictions. As
cases continued to rise and VOC 202012/01
spread throughout England, on 5 January 2021
a third national lockdown was introduced in
England, with schools and universities closed
and individuals advised to stay at home, with
measures to be kept in place until at least mid-
February 2021.
Data sources
To assess the spread of VOC 202012/01 in the
UK, we used publicly available sequencing-
based data from the COG-UK Consortium
(13) (5 February 2020–6 January 2021) and
Pillar 2 SARS-CoV-2 testing data provided
by Public Health England (1 October 2020–
7 January 2021) for estimating the frequency
of S gene target failure in England. COG-UK
sequencing data for Northern Ireland were
excluded because of low sample sizes.
To assess the spread of VOC 202012/01 in
Denmark, Switzerland, and the US, we used
publicly available sequence data giving the
incidence of VOC 202012/01 aggregated by
week and region provided by the Danish
Covid-19 Genome Consortium and the Statens
Serum Institut (32) (15 October 2020–28 January
2021), sequence andRT-PCR501Y.V1 rescreening
data giving the incidence of VOC 202012/01
in different regions of Switzerland provided
by Christian Althaus and Tanja Stadler and
the Geneva University Hospitals, the Swiss
Viollier Sequencing Consortium from ETH
Zürich, the Risch laboratory, the University
Hospital Basel, the Institute for Infectious
Diseases, University of Bern, and the Swiss
National Covid-19 Science Task Force (33, 34)
(2 November 2020–11 February 2021), and
publicly available US nationwide Helix SARS-
CoV-2 Surveillance data, comprising both S
gene target failure data and randomly selected
S-negative samples that were sequenced to
infer the proportion of S-negative samples
that were the VOC (35, 36) (6 September–11
February 2020).
To estimate mobility, we used anonymized
mobility data collected from smartphone users
by Google Community Mobility (11). Percent-
age change in mobility per day was calculated
for each lower-tier local authority in England,
and a generalized additivemodel with a spline
for time was fitted to these observations to
provide a smoothed effect of the change in
mobility over time (Fig. 1C).
To estimate social contact rates (Fig. 1D), we
used data on reported social contacts from the
CoMix survey (12), which is a weekly survey of
face-to-face contact patterns, taken from a sam-
ple of ~2500 individuals broadly representative
of the UK population with respect to age and
geographical location. We calculated the dis-
tribution of contacts using 1000 bootstrap
samples with replacement from the raw data.
Bootstrap samples were calculated at the par-
ticipant level, then all observations for those
participants were included in a sample to re-
spect the correlation structure of the data. We
collected data in two panels that alternated
weekly; therefore, we calculated the mean
smoothed over the 2-week intervals to give
a larger number of participants per estimate
and to account for panel effects. We calculated
themean number of contacts (face-to-face con-
versational contact or physical contact) in the
settings “home,” “work,” “education” (includ-
ing childcare, nurseries, schools, and univer-
sities and colleges), and “other” settings. We
calculated the mean contacts by age group
and area of residence (those areas that were
subsequently placed under Tier 4 restrictions
on 20December 2020 as theywere experiencing
highand rapidly increasing incidence, and those
areas of England that were not placed under
these restrictions). The mean number of con-
tacts was influenced by a few individuals who
reported very highnumbers of contacts (often in
a work context). The means shown here were
calculated by truncating the maximum number
of contacts recorded at 200 per individual per
day. We compared Rt estimates derived from
CoMix (12) to those derived from the REACT-
1 prevalence survey (9) for England.
Statistical methods in brief
GrowthofVOC202012/01after initialphylogenetic
observation. For each lineage i in the COG-UK
dataset, we pooled the number of sequences
observed within that lineage across the UK for
every day, t, yielding integer-valued sequence
counts N(i, t). We estimated the time-varying
exponential growth rates of cases of each
strain, r(i, t), using a negative binomial state-
space model correcting for day-of-week effects
whose dispersion parameter was optimized for
each strain by marginal likelihood maximiza-
tion. We defined the relativized growth rate of
a lineage i at time t as r(i, t) = ½rði; tÞ  rðtÞ=
srðtÞ, whererðtÞ is the average growth rate of
all circulating strains at time t and sr(t) is the
standard deviation of growth rates across all
lineages at time t, such that r(i, t) is analogous
to a z-statistic orWald-type statistic and allows
comparison of growth rate differences across
timewhen the average growth rate and scale of
growth rate differences varies.
Competitive advantage and increased growth
rate of VOC-202012/01. To estimate the increase
in growth rate of VOC 202012/01, we fitted a set
of multinomial and binomial generalized linear
mixedmodels (GLMMs), inwhichwe estimated
the rate by which the VOC displaces other
resident SARS-CoV-2 variants across different
regions in the UK, based on both the COG-UK
sequence data and the S gene target failure
data. In the analysis of the S gene target failure
data, binomial counts were adjusted for the
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true positive rate. For comparison, we also
calculated the growth advantage of the VOC in
Denmark, Switzerland, and the US based on
both sequencing and S gene target failure data.
All models took into account sample date and
region, plus (if desired) their interaction, and
all mixed models took into account possible
overdispersion and for theUK further included
local-tier local authority as a random intercept.
From these models, we estimated the differ-
ence in Malthusian growth rate between other
competing variants Dr, as well as the expected
multiplicative increase in basic reproduc-
tion number Rt and infectiousness, assuming
unaltered generation time, which can be shown
to be equal to exp(Dr.T), where T is the mean
generation interval. Themultiplicative increase
being equal to exp(Dr.T) is an approximation
that holds for a delta-distributed generation
interval, but we show in the supplementary
materials that this is a good approximation
for the gamma-distributed generation interval
that we assume. In our calculations, we used
estimated SARS-CoV-2mean generation times
T of either 5.5 days (14) (Table 1) or 3.6 days
(37, 38) (table S1).
Rt analysis. We calculated the weekly pro-
portion of positive tests that were S gene–
negative out of all positive tests that tested for
the S gene by English upper-tier local authority.
We used reproduction number estimates ob-
tained using the method described in (37)
and (39) and implemented in the EpiNow2 R
package (40), downloaded from https://github.
com/epiforecasts/covid-rt-estimates/blob/master/
subnational/united-kingdom-local/cases/summary/
rt.csv. We then built a separate model of the
expected reproduction number in UTLA i
during week t starting in the week beginning
5 October 2020 as a function of local restric-
tions, mobility indicators, residual temporal
variation, and proportion of positive tests with
S gene target failure. The residual temporal
variation is modeled either as a region-specific
thin-plate regression spline (“Regional time-
varying”) or a static regional parameter (“Re-
gional static”). The key estimand is the relative
change in reproduction number in the pres-
ence of S gene target failure that is not ex-
plained by any of the other variables.
Transmission dynamic model
We extended a previously developedmodeling
framework structured by age (in 5-year age
bands, with no births, deaths, or aging due to
the short time scales modeled) and by geo-
graphical region (10, 15) to include two variants
of SARS-CoV-2 (VOC 202012/01 and non-VOC
202012/01). Themodel is a discrete-time deter-
ministic compartmental model that allows
for arbitrary delay distributions for transitions
between compartments. We fitted this model
to multiple regionally stratified data sources
across the seven NHS England regions as pre-
viously: deaths, hospital admissions, hospital
bed occupancy, ICU bed occupancy, daily inci-
dence of new infections, PCR prevalence of
active infection, seroprevalence, and daily fre-
quency of VOC 202012/01 across each of the
regions as measured by S gene target failure
frequency corrected for false positives. The
model assumes that individuals with clinical
symptoms are more infectious than individu-
als with subclinical infection (19). We assume
that vaccinated individuals have a lower prob-
ability of both clinical and subclinical infec-
tion (fig. S9), but that vaccinated individuals
who do develop clinical or subclinical infec-
tion are as infectious as unvaccinated individ-
uals with clinical or subclinical infection. To
model school closure, we removed all school
contacts from our contact matrix based on
POLYMODdata and varying over time accord-
ing to Google Mobility indices, as described
(10). See supplementary materials for details
of Bayesian inference including likelihood
functions and prior distributions.
Our individual transmission model fits to
separate NHS regions of England produced
independent estimates of parameters such as
relative transmissibility and differences in
odds of hospitalization or death resulting from
infection with VOC 202012/01. To produce over-
all estimates for these parameters, we modeled
posterior distributions from individual NHS
regions as draws from a mixture distribution,
comprising a normally distributed top-level
distribution from which central estimates for
each NHS region are drawn. We report the
mean and credible intervals of the top-level
distribution when reporting model posterior
estimates for England.
In model fitting, we assume that our deter-
ministic transmission model approximates the
expectation over stochastic epidemic dynam-
ics. This is not exact (41), but the error in this
approximation is small for the population-
level processes we are modeling, as it decays
with 1/N (42). This approach is well devel-
oped for state-space models of communicable
disease dynamics that fit an epidemic process
to observed data via a stochastic observation
process.
Apparent growth of VOC 202012/01 not a result
of testing artifacts
The apparent frequency of VOC 202012/01
could be inflated relative to reality if this var-
iant leads to increased test-seeking behavior
(e.g., if it leads to a higher rate of symptoms
than preexisting variants). However, this would
not explain the growth in the relative frequency
of VOC 202012/01 over time. Mathematically,
if variant 1 has growth rate r1 and variant 2 has
growth rate r2, the relative frequency over
time is a2 exp(r2t)/[a1 exp(r1t) + a2 exp(r2t)],
where a1 and a2 are the frequency of variants
1 and 2, respectively, at time t = 0. However, if
variant 1 has probability x of being reported
and variant 2 has probability y, and both have
growth rate r, the relative frequency over time
is a2 y exp(rt)/[a1 x exp(rt) + a2 y exp(rt)], which
is constant.
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